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FOREWORD
The relationship between corruption and stability
is complex. What is clear is that corruption increases
the level of instability and the risk of conflict by undermining the legitimacy and credibility of state institutions. For peacekeeping and state-building interventions to be effective, careful consideration must be
given as to the reason the problem occurs, and to its
broader impact, as well as ways to manage it.
In this Letort Paper, British academic and practitioner Dr. Shima Keene provides a comprehensive
assessment of the relationship between corruption,
legitimacy, and stability in fragile states, and explores what must be done by the U.S. Army to counter these issues that directly impact its operational
effectiveness.
Dr. Keene is a subject matter expert in the fields
of asymmetric warfare, counterterrorism (CT), and
country stabilization. In her current role as Deployable Civilian Expert (DCE) for the United Kingdom
(UK) Stabilisation Unit (SU) specializing in security
and justice, she has developed considerable insight
into the impact of corruption in fragile states, in theaters that include Afghanistan and Iraq.
This Letort Paper explores the subject of corruption as both a cause and effect of poor leadership and
governance, as well as how Western interventions can
exacerbate the problem. It suggests ways in which
these unintended consequences may be mitigated in
future operations. Dr. Keene also highlights the need
for anti-corruption measures to be integrated into existing policy and operational procedures, and offers
insights as to how this could be achieved.
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The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) considers that
this Letort Paper provides a useful assessment of the
key issues relating to corruption, legitimacy, and stability as well as their collective implications for the
U.S. Army, and makes a valuable contribution to the
debate on how to plan and shape future U.S. peace
and stability operations.
			

			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
Corruption increases the level of instability and
the risk of conflict by undermining the legitimacy and
credibility of state institutions as well as of peacekeeping and state-building interventions by the international community, to include the U.S. Army.
Post-conflict states, or states emerging from conflict,
are particularly vulnerable to corruption, due to the
lack of good governance infrastructures, which makes
it difficult to detect, disrupt, or bring about successful
prosecutions against those who are involved in activities such as bribery, extortion, false accounting, and
embezzlement.
Where corruption is rife, it is widely acknowledged
that funds intended for country stabilization projects
often do not reach their intended recipients. This, in
part, is the reason that tackling corruption has become
a high priority in some post-conflict transitions. In addition, anti-corruption efforts, whether direct or indirect, are seen as having a potentially legitimizing and
stabilizing effect. However, such measures can only
be successful if implemented with strong, high-level
leadership, as corruption has the potential to contribute to legitimacy as well as to erode it. Lack of legitimacy is a common feature of fragile states, which have
failed to establish good governance.
Poor governance, in turn, results in an environment where corruption and criminality can flourish.
Corrupt individuals holding senior public roles of
influence are able to abuse their positions to further
their own personal goals and accumulate personal
wealth, to the detriment of the people who they are
intended to serve. This results in instability through
the inevitable sense of injustice and desperation that
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develops amongst the citizens of that regime, which
can drive populations to civil war and leaves citizens
susceptible to crime and radicalization, both as perpetrators and as victims.
History has repeatedly illustrated that this problem, if not dealt with effectively, will inevitably lead
to conflict and instability, not only in the country directly affected, but in the global community, as fragile or failed states become fertile breeding grounds
for insurgency, terrorism, and organized crime. This
has direct consequences for the United States both at
home and abroad.
For the U.S. Army, the threat of force and the
ability to use force will always remain an important
part of the military remit, but there is an increasing
acknowledgment that such measures must be used as
a last resort. Consequently, it is appropriate that the
U.S. Army familiarize itself with alternative measures
to achieve stability other than force. In tackling corrupt or hostile leadership, there are other effective
ways in which corrupt leaders can be dealt with, such
as the confiscation of assets, including funds that are
the proceeds of bribery.
As such, it is essential that the U. S. Army develop
an understanding of the ways in which corrupt leaders exploit funds, as well as the roles that the U.S.
Government and the international community play
in bringing such individuals to justice—the threat of
which in itself can serve as a deterrent to such behavior—or bring individuals who have committed such
crimes against their own people to justice. In addition,
it is vital that the U.S. Army appreciates the unintended consequences of international interventions, like
the mismanagement of international aid and funding,
which exacerbates bribery and corruption and may do
more to destabilize, rather than stabilize, a country.
xii

The answer is to develop an integrated approach
whereby anti-corruption measures are combined with
existing policy and operational procedures so that
corruption is not treated as a standalone problem. This
can only be achieved through developing a contextual understanding of the interconnected challenges
in relation to corruption, leadership, and stability, as
well as addressing existing knowledge gaps through
effective training and education. Furthermore, it is
essential to implement monitoring and evaluation
policies to promote a culture of transparency that assists with the prevention of corruption; and that intelligence assessments—to include the use of financial
intelligence—are fully exploited toward that aim.
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CORRUPTION, LEGITIMACY, AND STABILITY:
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. ARMY
INTRODUCTION
Corruption increases the level of instability and
the risk of conflict by undermining the legitimacy
and credibility of state institutions, as well as peacekeeping and state-building interventions by the international community, to include the U.S. Army.
Post-conflict states or states emerging from conflict
are particularly vulnerable to corruption, due to the
lack of good governance infrastructures, which makes
it difficult to detect, disrupt, or bring about successful
prosecutions against those who are involved in activities such as bribery, extortion, false accounting, and
embezzlement. History has repeatedly illustrated that
this problem, if not dealt with effectively, will lead to
further conflict and instability. This is problematic for
the country immediately affected, and also has global
security implications, because a fragile or failed state
can become a fertile breeding ground for insurgency,
terrorism, and organized crime. This has direct consequences for the United States, both at home and
abroad.
Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that
corruption undermines interventions by the international community involved in peacekeeping and nation building. Additionally, corruption can increase
the physical security risk to U.S. Army personnel
and potentially damage the reputation of the Army
itself if it is perceived to be working with personnel
deemed to be corrupt. Consequently, the subject of
corruption should be a key consideration when attempting to tackle conflict as well as related threats
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such as organized crime, insurgency, and terrorism.
However, corruption is often viewed by the military
and other stakeholders involved in peacekeeping and
state-building operations as an unfortunate characteristic of the “local culture” and tolerated as something
that is too difficult to tackle. Alternatively, too often,
it is considered to be a specialist topic or a side issue
outside the immediate objectives of the mission.
The general neglect of the problem of corruption
by militaries was evidenced in the 2013 Transparency
International Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index Report, which found that only Australia, Sweden,
and Spain provided training in counter corruption for
commanders at all levels to ensure that they were fully aware of the corruption issues they may face during
deployment.1 The report also highlighted that two different countries, the United States and Greece, were
the only ones to have written military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations.
If achieving stability and security is a top priority for
any intervention by the international community in an
unstable or war-torn country, then countering corruption needs to be considered a priority objective by all
states involved in overseas operations.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. ARMY
In addition to its traditional combat functions, the
military is increasingly becoming recognized as playing a key role in conflict resolutions as well as immediate post-conflict peacekeeping and state-building interventions.2 In recent years, peacekeeping operations
have served as a vehicle for the delivery of wider state
functions, such as border security and crime fighting,
as well as a coordination mechanism for other actors,
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becoming a focal point for longer-term capacity building. One lesson from previous missions that has been
repeatedly underscored is the inability to tackle corruption, which is recognized as a central factor undermining international interventions and requires
immediate attention.
A case in point is Afghanistan. Since the fall of
the Taliban in 2001, a considerable investment has
been made by the United States—including the U.S.
Army—and its international partners to attempt to
establish and professionalize Afghan state institutions that are key to delivering and sustaining stability within Afghanistan. To that aim, international
assistance has been provided to a number of Afghan
institutions such as the Ministry of Interior, to include
the police and the judiciary. However, recent research
shows that widespread corruption, coupled with other challenges, such as the worsening security environment, has seriously undermined these interventions,
making it highly questionable whether any achievements to date were effective, let alone sustainable.
Helmand Province in Southern Afghanistan is
one example of the failure to achieve meaningful
and sustainable results.3 When American and British
troops began their withdrawal from the province in
October 2014, a return to Helmand was considered
unlikely. However, in February 2016, only 16 months
after withdrawal, the U.S. Army’s 10th Mountain Division was redeployed as a result of the inability of
the Afghan army to operate effectively without international assistance.4 According to Brigadier General
Charles Cleveland, Chief of Communications for the
U.S.-led coalition, the deteriorating security situation has led to renewed concerns regarding the threat
from international terrorism, resulting in the need to
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re-establish an international presence in Helmand to
combat the threat.5 Although, it would not be possible
to provide definitive comment on the extent to which
corruption played a role in the resurgence of the most
recent insecurity, interviews carried out with military
and civilian personnel involved in the Helmand campaign suggest that corruption played a major role in
the failure to achieve sustainable stability there.6 This
most recent development in the deteriorating security
situation also confirms the concern that lessons were
not adequately learned from the initial campaign, and
failure to tackle corruption is likely to result in history repeating itself. This in turn will inevitably result
in an ongoing need for U.S. military involvement as
the threat of international terrorism re-emerges in the
region.
Outside the Afghan campaign, the impact of corruption on peacekeeping and state-building missions
is also becoming increasingly relevant to the U.S.
Army as demand for peacekeeping and stabilization
missions around the globe continues. Other missions
requiring international assistance include Somalia,
Mali, Nigeria, and Ukraine, all of which are affected
by corruption. It is essential, therefore, that the U.S.
Army not only understands, but also absorbs, the
lessons from Afghanistan and other campaigns and
adapts and applies those lessons to future missions,
both at strategic and operational levels, in order to
achieve long-term stability not only for those countries directly affected, but also as part of a global security agenda.
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CORRUPTION: DEFINITION, PERCEPTION,
AND SCOPE
Despite the wide use of the term “corruption,”
there is rarely agreement as to what the word means
in practice. According to one definition, “corruption,”
from its Latin root cor, meaning “altogether” and
rumpere, “break,” suggests that if someone or something is corrupt, they have broken the moral code of
behavior by performing immoral or illegal acts for personal gain without apology.7 Corruption can also be
defined as a deviation of practice or behavior from
previously established purposes or expectations. However, what constitutes “corruption” in practice varies
according to cultural perspective. For example, Western cultures would consider the offering, payment or
receiving of “bribery” money to be corruption, even
though what may constitute “bribery” differs greatly.8 At the same time, such activities may be deemed
perfectly acceptable in other cultures.
A case in point is the payment of a user fee or gratuity to low-ranking civil servants in Afghanistan.
According to a report produced by the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF), most Afghans consider the practice of baksheesh (a user fee or gratuity
for services rendered) to be acceptable and justifiable.9
This is because there is a general consensus amongst
the Afghan people that payment is needed to supplement low wages and because the “beneficiaries of
‘corruption’ were often not ‘private’ individuals, but
members of ethnic and/or tribal patronage networks
who looked upon these payments as providing traditional means for survival.”10 A comparable situation
pertains to Russia, where anti-corruption programs
habitually fail, in part because ordinary people see
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additional payments or gifts to officials as an essential—in fact, the only—means of inducing them to
carry out their functions.11
These and other examples of widely varying cultural practices around the world raise the consideration of whether U.S. Army internal policies can be
adjusted to match local interpretations of corruption
and to what extent should unacceptable and corrupt
activities be tolerated or leveraged when operating
abroad.
A second consideration is to what extent should
U.S. military personnel adjust their own behavior with
respect to actions and customs considered acceptable
on home soil, but offensive to local populations and
deemed corrupt according to the host culture. For
example, a recent report published by Transparency
International highlighted that Afghans consider managerial incompetence or ineptitude to be corruption.12
One example provided was the waste generated by
the mismanagement of international contracts, in
which the hiring of multiple subcontractors for one
contract led to inefficiencies, resulting in only 5 to 10
percent of the original contract value being delivered
on the ground.13 Although subcontracting is entirely
legal and the West would consider this to be an issue
of poor performance, not necessarily involving malfeasance, from the Afghan perspective this constitutes
corruption. This again is something that directly affects the U.S. Army, especially where contractors are
utilized. Similarly, it is important for the Army—and
for the Department of Defense (DoD) more broadly—
to ensure effective oversight and to properly manage
contracts and be directly responsible for the behavior
and performance of subcontractors in order to protect
its own reputation as the “owner” of those contracts.
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It is also interesting to note that there are over 15
words for corruption in Dari and Pashtu, the two official languages spoken in Afghanistan.14 This is relevant in that linguistics can provide insights into the
importance a culture places on certain matters. Generally speaking, the more words there are to describe
something, the more prevalent that subject is in that
society. For example, Japan has a deep-rooted shame
culture and has at least seven words to describe various types of emotions relating to various aspects of
shameful behavior.15 Similarly, the fact that so many
words exist for corruption in Dari and Pashtu can
be seen as indicative of the significance corruption
has in Afghan society. It also further highlights the
differences between the Western and Afghan cultures in terms of the perception of what constitutes
corruption, as well as the complexities associated with
the issue.16
Despite these differences in attitudes, establishing
an agreed-upon definition for corruption is the first
vital step, because without an agreement on exactly
what the problem is, any measures taken to counter
it will be ineffective. Nevertheless, it is no surprise
that there is no universally agreed definition of corruption. According to the World Bank, corruption is
“the abuse of public office for private gain.”17 This is
similar to the ISAF definition as “the misuse of positions of power for personal gain.”18 Unfortunately,
these definitions proved problematic in some countries where the words “abuse” and “private” are often
not appropriate in this context, as highlighted in the
aforementioned example of baksheesh in Afghanistan.
As such, this Letort Paper will adopt the definition provided by Transparency International, which
appears to be the best suited for describing corruption in the context of conflict environments, namely,
7

“the abuse of entrusted [public or private] power for
[illegitimate] private [or group] gain.”19 To elaborate
further, practices that are deemed as corrupt include
bribery, extortion, mismanagement of public funds,
stealing by public servants, neglect of duty, causing
financial loss to the government, making false claims,
embezzlement of funds, and the abuse of office, such
as nepotism, forgery, and false accounting in public
institutions and others.20
The Corruption Cycle.
In attempting to tackle corruption as a means of
preventing or mitigating conflict, it is important to understand how corruption affects conflict and leads to
insecurity. However, when examining the relationship
between corruption and conflict, it is difficult to determine whether corruption leads to conflict, or whether
corruption occurs as a result of the conflict environment. This is because corruption is both a cause and a
consequence of conflict. Therefore, the relationship is
better described as a cycle fueled by a number of factors, such as poor leadership, lack of legitimacy, and
poor governance. Each of these factors, as well as their
interrelated nature, needs to be fully appreciated by
the U.S. Army if its stability deployment missions are
intended to have longer-lasting effects.
A government with good leadership, deemed to be
legitimate in the eyes of its citizens and supported by
good governance structures that operate effectively, is
able to reduce the incidence of corruption. Although
corruption cannot be totally eliminated, these positive
factors can assist in reducing corruption to a manageable level at which conflict and instability may be
avoided, as illustrated in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Reduced Corruption Risk.
Figure 2, on the other hand, illustrates the opposite
scenario, in which the combination of negative influences, such as corrupt leadership, lack of legitimacy,
and poor governance, exacerbates the existing problem of corruption and leads to conflict and instability.

Figure 2. Elevated Corruption Risk.
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The linkages between corruption, governance, and
conflict are interrelated and complex, and, as the drivers of corruption, are capable of increasing or lowering
corruption risk. The relationship between corruption
and governance, leadership and legitimacy, respectively, deserves further attention.21
Governance.
Governance has been defined as the manner in
which power is exercised in the management of a
country’s economic and social resources for development, or as the exercise of political, economic, and administrative authority in the management of a country’s affairs at all levels, to include the private sector
and civil society.22 It is a subject highly relevant to the
U.S. Army not only in terms of the impact of poor governance on the stability of nations, but also because it
has very real and practical implications for the successful completion of a post-conflict or stabilization
mission. This is because poor governance structures
characterized by corruption will undermine any external intervention, including efforts to strengthen the
capability of the domestic security forces to include
the army and the police.
Poor governance occurs when the management of
public resources is inadequate and unable to meet the
critical needs of the society.23 The key characteristics
of poor governance are a lack of transparency and accountability, poor legislative oversight, abuse of human rights, societal inequality, and the general absence
of rule of law. Collectively, poor governance results
in an environment where corruption and criminality
can flourish. Corrupt individuals holding senior public roles of influence are able to abuse their positions
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to further their own personal goals and accumulate
personal wealth, to the detriment of the people who
they are intended to serve. However, the application
of “good governance” principles can make it more difficult for corruption to take root.24
The importance of establishing effective rule of law
as a key component of a government’s governance
infrastructure cannot be overstated. Rule of law is an
inherently vague term and has no universally agreedupon definition. One interpretation is that everyone
should be governed by and equal before the law and
constitution established by the legitimate government
of the country in which they live, that they enjoy human rights, and that justice is open and accountable
to independent oversight. Institutions that enable the
rule of law include law enforcement, the judiciary,
and the penal system. The term is commonly used
to describe civil institutions, as opposed to military
institutions, which generally have their own parallel
legal systems and institutions. However, in countries
where the police are heavily militarized, the distinction between civilian and military becomes less clear.
Without rule of law, corrupt individuals are able
to enjoy impunity as a consequence of a dysfunctional
law enforcement and judicial system.25 Where rule of
law prevails, citizens have equal standing under the
law regardless of their political affiliation, social status, economic power, or ethnic background. In countries such as Afghanistan, the absence of rule of law
is almost axiomatic. Afghanistan is a country where
access to fair, efficient, and transparent justice continues to be limited. Senior judicial appointments are often made based on patronage or payment, as opposed
to merit or qualification. In addition, formal Afghan
courts are often difficult to access, especially for peo-
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ple in the provinces. The courts are widely viewed by
Afghan citizens as corrupt and lacking efficacy, partly
because of the time it takes for the system to reach a
verdict, and even when a verdict is reached, money
can be paid to overturn the conviction.
This lack of justice characterized by corrupt practices is exacerbated by the complexity of the Afghan
justice system, which incorporates hundreds of years
of informal traditions, Islamic Shari’a law, former Soviet judicial practices introduced during the 1980s, as
well as various Western influences since the fall of the
Taliban in 2001.26 Afghanistan’s legal landscape is occupied by three competing sources of law operating
simultaneously; namely, the formal state legal system
reflected in various codes and legislation and enforced
through a system of state courts; the informal customary system based on tribal mediation; and the Taliban
legal system.27
The various shortfalls in the state system and its
reputation for being corrupt, slow, and ineffective
have resulted in continued reliance on the informal
justice system, including the Taliban system of justice,
which continues to be a popular system, as it is better
able to reach verdicts quickly and effectively and is
believed to be the least corrupt. This is problematic
for two reasons. First, the punishments passed by the
Taliban justice system, such as stoning an adulterer
to death, conflict with commitments to human rights
under both the Afghan Constitution and international
law. Second, reliance on this system of justice gives
the Taliban legitimacy, authority, and power, which
is detrimental to interventions to counter the Taliban
insurgency. The latter point is particularly relevant
to the U.S. Army, whose resources continue to be in
high demand in the ongoing conflict with the Taliban,
which has now entered its fifteenth year.28
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Despite intentions to reduce American military
personnel on the ground in Afghanistan, former U.S.
President Barack Obama’s remarks made on May 23,
2016, with respect to the justification of the drone attacks to eliminate Mullah Mohammed Akhtar Mansour, indicate the trouble the United States has had
in developing the Afghan security infrastructure to a
level that it can operate on its own against Taliban attacks.29 If the U.S. Army is serious about tackling the
threat from the Taliban, it needs to not only focus on
the combat capability of Afghanistan’s security forces,
but also consider further the reasons the Taliban is
able to maintain its power and authority. Part of the
answer is its ability to deliver better rule of law and
justice compared to the “legitimate” rule of law infrastructure of the Afghan authorities.
A further problem is that law enforcement in Afghanistan is also riddled with corruption.30 District
police chiefs, for example, are able to buy their positions for $100,000.31 The Afghan National Police (ANP)
views itself as a military organization and does not see
itself as a service for the community. It views the local
population as a target for corruption, from which to
extract bribery money, as opposed to a community to
protect.32 It also sees itself as above the law, going unpunished for any crime committed. In an environment
where human rights abuses are commonplace, this
causes further resentment amongst Afghan citizens.33
This is particularly problematic in more “traditional” regions, such as Helmand Province, where women
and children continue to be seen as disposable possessions, and customs that are in serious violation of
international human rights law continue to be practiced by the police on a regular basis.34 When a state
institution such as the police, whose notional purpose
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is to protect the citizens of its country, is corrupt, it
inevitably leads to a sense of great injustice and desperation, which in turn fosters instability.
Another important aspect of good governance
is the ability to manage public administration effectively. Depriving the state of resources through misallocation and corruption weakens the ability of the
state to provide key public services, such as justice
and security. For example, if police officers remain
unpaid or receive inadequate equipment or training
to carry out their tasks as a result of embezzlement,
their ability and motivation to serve are likely to decline, directly impacting the security of the state. In
Afghanistan, such scenarios have led to police officers
leaving their posts to join the insurgency on economic
grounds as opposed to on the basis of ideology.35 This
has had the effect of further exacerbating the security
situation by tipping the scales in favor of the enemy,
further hampering the U.S. Army in its fight against
the insurgency.
Legitimacy.
Poor governance characterized by corruption also
brings into question the legitimacy of the leadership
and the regime. It is problematic for the U.S. Army
on several levels if the political leadership and its regime are considered to be illegitimate by its citizens,
regardless of how they came to power. First, achieving security and stability requires the support of the
local populations. It will be difficult to win the hearts
and minds of local populations if the Army is assisting a political regime that is viewed as “illegitimate”
in the eyes of its people. In fact, those who resent
the regime will de facto deem the U.S. Army as the
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“enemy.” As such, not only will the Army suffer a lack
of credibility among local populations, but its actions
may also come under criticism by American citizens at
home, who are likely to question why their taxes are
being spent on supporting a corrupt regime that is not
viewed by its citizens as a legitimate source of authority. The situation will be further exacerbated as soon
as the instability results in civilian or military casualties and deaths.
Corruption also has the ability to undermine the legitimacy of the state, in cases where the government’s
failure to fulfill its citizens’ expectations increases their
willingness to violently challenge the existing regime.
This was witnessed in the Arab Spring, where corruption was a central narrative and addressing it was a
central demand of protesters.36 The ability of corruption to undermine the legitimacy of the state holds
true even when the state and its leadership have been
established through legitimate means. This is because,
although that government may technically be deemed
as “legitimate” in the way it came into existence and
operates according to the laws of that country, several
other factors may exist that override its legitimacy.37
For example, if there are no laws as to how a government and its leaders are appointed or re-appointed,
or if the system is so corrupt that electoral procedures
are deemed meaningless, then the government will
lack legitimacy.
A legitimate government has justifiable authority
and power, which enable it to maintain public order, and can exercise moral justification to induce its
citizens to obey its laws. A corrupt government loses
legitimacy on the grounds of morality as well as in
practical terms, as a result of its inability to deliver
basic services to its citizens.
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At the same time, despite the importance of tackling corruption, consideration must be given to the fact
that attempting to implement anti-corruption measures too aggressively and too quickly may do more
to erode legitimacy than to contribute to it.38 This is
especially true when proper governance systems are
not yet in place that are capable of supporting such
measures. This is because corruption often permeates not just one single individual or group of individuals, but the entire political network, and taking
apart entire networks can do more harm than good
because they are a component of the overall system.
If the problem has become an institutional trait within
that country, caution needs to be exercised in trying to
remove it. For example, corruption may have become
a way of life in many societies, as described in the case
of Russia above, or may be a necessary evil for survival when the systems, institutions, and processes that
should protect the safety and well-being of citizens
are weak or completely lacking.39 Instead, corruption
needs to be tackled carefully, thoughtfully and over
time.40 To use a medical analogy: if corruption is a
cancer affecting a vital organ, then a less immediate
treatment than excision is required in order to prevent
the patient from dying.
Consequently, governments emerging from conflict, along with the international community that
provides support to those governments (to include
the U.S. Army), face a major dilemma in deciding the
approach to be adopted in tackling corruption. The
dilemma is whether to attempt to increase legitimacy
by bringing former senior officials involved in crimes
(like corruption and drug trafficking) to justice, or to
reinstate these individuals, who have established a
support network out of concern that removing them
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may have a destabilizing effect in that region.41 There
is also the question, if corruption is to be tackled over
time in a piecemeal manner, which corrupt individuals
in positions of power and influence should be tackled
first. The decision is likely to depend partly on whether there is a suitable candidate to take their place. If
not, simply removing those individuals is likely to result in instability. Such decisions can be made only if
there is sufficient intelligence on corrupt networks in
order to make these assessments. Analysis of this kind
would require the U.S. military to establish or access
appropriate resources within the intelligence community, with the ability to make short-, medium-, and
longer-term impact assessments of the effects of dismantling corruption networks and infrastructures, in
order to be able to guide military commanders on the
action they should take in tackling corruption. Given
the current lack of analysis of corrupt networks, it is
unsurprising that some consider tolerating corruption
in the short term an acceptable price to pay for stability over legitimacy.
The problem is that this further encourages a
short-term approach to tackling the problem. This is
particularly true in the case of the U.S. Army and other militaries whose units are deployed to countries on
an annual or 6-month cycle. Commanders are placed
under enormous pressure to achieve often very unrealistic goals within their tours of duty, as well as to
make this achievement demonstrable to further their
careers within the military.42 Since tackling corruption
requires a long-term sustained effort likely to extend
over several tours of duty, it is essential that senior
leadership recognizes this problem and adjusts its
expectations of commanders accordingly.
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Corrupt Leadership.
The third factor to be considered in the corruption
cycle is the matter of national leadership. This issue is
particularly important for the U.S. Army, as military
interventions often take the form of action to support
the current leadership of the country. Corrupt leadership not only will have operational consequences
for the U.S. Army in terms of that particular mission,
but is likely to risk wider reputational damage with
longer-term consequences. Furthermore, if the leaders
that the U.S. Army is working with emerge as being
corrupt during a mission, it is important that steps are
taken to ensure that the problem is recognized and
addressed in order to protect the Army’s own integrity and reputation. It is therefore essential that U.S.
military personnel are able to recognize corrupt leadership, and understand the motivations for it, as well
as to establish Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)
to ensure that adequate steps are taken to tackle the
problem.
Corrupt leaders are driven by self-interest and
motivated by the pursuit of power. Powerful leaders, in turn, seek to obtain even more power. Money
plays a key role in achieving that power and lifestyle,
and it is widely recognized that corrupt senior officials throughout the world abuse funds intended for
the public good. In such cases, there is much that the
international financial system can achieve in interdicting and confiscating such funds with the cooperation
of in-country authorities as well as the wider international community, to include law enforcement and the
judiciary.
One example of the abuse of public funds by a corrupt leader is the case of Pavel Lazarenko, the former
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Prime Minister of Ukraine. Lazarenko acquired $20
million of public funds through theft and extortion
during his time in office between 1996 and 1997. He
then laundered the money through U.S. banks in the
period that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union.
An American jury convicted Lazarenko in 2004 for
money laundering and sentenced him to 9 years in
prison.43 The significance of this case is that this was
the first time that a senior politician of a foreign jurisdiction was put on trial in a U.S. court for crimes
committed in his own country. Furthermore, the U.S.
ruling is believed to have supported Ukraine’s efforts
to strengthen its own legislation with respect to corruption and money laundering whilst reinforcing a
strong anti-corruption message in Ukraine.44
Another example is the case of Joshua Dariye, the
former governor of the Plateau State in Nigeria, who
was in office between 1999 and 2007. In 2003, a credit
card fraud investigation in London led by the Metropolitan Police found that Dariye had laundered approximately $5 million through associates and front
companies, which led to his arrest in 2004. After being released on bail, he fled England and managed to
avoid arrest as a result of his constitutional immunity.
However, the British Crown Prosecution Service (CPS)
filed an international freezing order for his assets outside of Nigeria. Consequently, the Nigerian Economic
and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), through
the assistance of the London Metropolitan Police and
the CPS, was able recover a house and around $8 million from multiple bank accounts in London. When
Dariye eventually stepped down from office in 2007,
he lost his political immunity, and the EFCC was finally able to bring about a successful prosecution against
him in Nigeria.45
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Other examples of large-scale theft of public resources from developing countries by former leaders
include Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines, former
Nigerian President General Sani Abacha, and former
President Mobuto Sese Seko of Zaire.46 A common
denominator of these cases is the way in which the
illicit proceeds of corruption were channeled to bank
accounts in foreign countries, typically jurisdictions
with high levels of banking secrecy, and in all cases,
large amounts of money were recovered after these
leaders left power. As such, the U.S. Army should
develop a basic familiarity with money-laundering
methods as part of its intelligence capability, in order that such activity can be recognized, monitored,
and interdicted as appropriate, at the earliest possible
opportunity, and ideally with the cooperation of incountry authorities.
MONEY LAUNDERING
Money laundering is the process by which the existence, illegal source, or illegal application of income is
concealed and then disguised to make it appear legitimate.47 The money-laundering process is recognized
as having three stages: “placement,” “layering,” and
“integration.” In the first stage of “placement,” cash is
placed into circulation through a number of vehicles,
including financial institutions, such as banks. Next,
in the “layering” phase, a complex web of transactions
is created to enable the disassociation of the funds
from their illicit source. This can be achieved through
the creation of “dummy” accounts, multiple transfers,
and international transfers. Finally, during the “integration” phase, the laundered funds are brought back
into circulation in the form of clean and often taxable income through methods such as property deal20

ing, the use of front companies, false loans, and false
invoicing.48
However, this model describing the money-laundering process has been criticized by some practitioners who argue that it is misleading from an operational perspective, in that criminals do not necessarily
follow the steps identified sequentially. As a result,
the model has been simplified more recently to be described as “raise, move, and store.”49 In terms of the
specific methods used, the United Kingdom’s (UK)
National Crime Agency (NCA) describes them as
falling into one of two broad categories: cash-based
money laundering or high-end money laundering.50
Cash-based money laundering can occur in several
ways. One is currency smuggling, which involves the
physical movement of currency over national borders
through, for example, the use of cash couriers. This is
particularly relevant for the U.S. Army and its international partners when operating in conflict environments, as large amounts of cash are easily detectable.
Any currency transaction reports (CTR) carried out
should note the presence of large volumes of cash, and
observations of regular movements of cash transported via vehicle, truck, helicopter or fixed-wing aircraft
should be collated, identifying the travel origin and
destination wherever possible.
Once the money enters jurisdictions where strict
banking compliance practices exist, other techniques
to get the cash into the banking system are used. One
well-known technique is “smurfing,” where cash is
deposited in random quantities less than the amount
when reporting is required in that jurisdiction. For example, in the United States, the threshold is $10,000;
therefore, random amounts of less than $10,000 can
be deposited into various accounts, including those
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held by relatives or friends at many different banks,
in order to minimize detection. This is where understanding corruption networks becomes particularly
relevant, as these networks are likely to be utilized for
money-laundering purposes. In addition, businesses
with high cash throughput may be used as a cover,
with payments being broken down even further into
smaller amounts to avoid detection.51 After all, the
best place to camouflage “bad” money is with “good”
money and as such, money launderers often utilize
cash businesses for this purpose. The key is to determine whether these businesses are proving to be more
“profitable” than they should be, indicating that additional cash, possibly the proceeds of crime, is being
added to the takings.
High-end money laundering, on the other hand,
usually involves transactions of substantial value, and
the abuse of the financial sector by so-called “professional enablers.”52 Examples include the use of currency exchanges and securities brokerage houses,
shell companies, tax havens, and offshore financial
centers.53 Shell companies are usually non-publicly
traded corporations, limited liability companies, and
trusts that typically have no physical presence other
than a mailing address and generate little to no independent economic value.54 Their purpose is to provide
opacity in order to confuse even the most dedicated
and well-resourced investigators and to defeat any
attempt to reconstruct a money trail. Intelligence
analysts investigating corruption in particular should
be alert to the existence and nature of these entities
and incorporate them into their analysis of networks
wherever possible.
Another method of laundering money that intelligence officers should consider is the purchase of
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assets.55 The criterion is that they must be of high value in relation to bulk, making them physically easy
to smuggle as well as relatively easy to reconvert into
cash at the point of destination. Examples include diamonds, gold, precious stamps, and other collectibles.
High-value assets such as property, vehicles, and
business assets can also be bought, which can then be
sold as part of the money-laundering process.56 The financial audit trail can be further obscured when these
assets are bought in the name of family members or
companies. The properties have also been known to
be used as vehicles for money laundering through additional financial arrangements such as mortgages.
Countering Money Laundering.
According to Global Financial Integrity, approximately $1 trillion of illicit funds were estimated to
have been removed from developing countries between 2002 and 2006.57 A considerable proportion of
these funds are likely to be the result of corruption
either directly, as proceeds of bribery, corruption, and
theft of public funds or indirectly, resulting from willful blindness to crimes including human trafficking,
narcotics trafficking, or arms trafficking, where both
senior and junior officials may have played a part in
allowing crimes to be committed and go unpunished.
In this context, intelligence analysts trying to piece
together a money-laundering pattern based on corruption will not be starting from scratch, since there
is likely to be considerable intelligence captured from
activities such as narcotics trafficking and arms trafficking. What is required is to bring together these
strands of available intelligence and re-interpret
the information from a counter money-laundering
perspective.
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In terms of action that could be taken when the proceeds of crime stay within the country of origin and
circulate within that country, interdiction and seizures
of these criminal funds through normal legal means
may prove difficult. This is because fragile states tend
to suffer poor governance structures and lack effective
rule of law institutions, which are likely in themselves
to have been affected by corruption. Nevertheless,
capturing this information will be invaluable for intelligence analysts, because understanding financial
flows can be fundamental to understanding key networks and their vulnerabilities.
Another characteristic of fragile states is the lack of
a developed economy, making investment and expenditure more difficult. As part of the laundering process, a likely scenario is that the bulk of illicit funds will
leave that country to make their way to economically
stable countries where the money can be laundered
and invested more effectively. For example, for an investor, it is far more prudent to invest in real estate in
countries where property prices are higher, property
rights are strong, the value of the property is likely to
increase, and resale of that property is guaranteed.58
Similarly, the purchase of financial instruments or
commodities in financial markets where the economy
is stable provides a greater degree of security for the
investment.
When illicit financial flows leave the country of
origin into developed economies such as the United
States or the United Kingdom, anti-money laundering (AML) interventions by the international community can play a key part in reducing them through
detection, interdiction, and confiscation. Here, the
U.S. Army could work with its U.S. and international
partners in several ways. It could share intelligence on
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corrupt networks and suspected money-laundering
activity. If intelligence analysts are trained appropriately, this could be achieved through sanitized reporting, thus protecting sensitive intelligence, whilst sharing information for the mutual benefit of the whole
counterterrorism (CT)/counterinsurgency (COIN)/
counter-crime community. As such, the concept of
“Need to Know” can operate simultaneously with the
concept of “Need to Share.”
The concept of “Need to Share” has become
recognized as particularly important within the
financial community as well as in government
departments that have set up various intelligence fusion cells in recent years. Initially the concept was met
with much skepticism and resistance—unsurprisingly,
as this inevitably involved sharing sensitive information that each party felt could make them more vulnerable to a number of security threats. This concern was
felt within financial institutions in the private sector
as well as in government departments. For example,
private sector organizations were concerned about
protecting their commercial interests from other similar organizations whom they regarded as competitors
as opposed to partners. Equally, organizations operating in the public space were concerned about sharing
sensitive material for fear that the broader significance
of that information might not be immediately apparent to other stakeholders, therefore remaining open to
potential abuse.
Despite these challenges, significant progress has
been made in recent years to share information to the
benefit of all stakeholders. Although the use of fusion cells has enabled better cooperation among the
military, government agencies, and law enforcement,
meaningful collaboration with the private sector con-
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tinues to be rare, and the analysis and use of financial
intelligence is basic at best. This is particularly relevant with respect to financial intelligence, as the AML
regime globally has been considerably strengthened
since the 9/11 attacks. This highlighted the importance of considering the financial aspects of terrorism
as part of the overall CT effort.59
To begin with, private sector organizations such
as banks, law firms, accountancy firms, and real estate agencies serve as the first line of defense in the
detection of suspicious funds.60 International AML
regulations, supported by the Financial Action Task
Force (FATF) recommendations, stipulate that these
businesses must become familiar with their customers prior to commencing business with them.61 This is
referred to as the “Know Your Customer” rule, which
is the process of basic due diligence to verify the identity of clients. The purpose is to enable businesses to
effectively manage their money-laundering risks by
reducing the likelihood that they will take on a client
who will be using them to launder money. This in turn
helps organizations manage their regulatory risk by
ensuring compliance with domestic legislation and
regulations relating to money-laundering and terrorist finance.62
Additional due diligence is required when dealing with individuals who are considered to be higher
risk, known as politically exposed persons (PEP). A
PEP is an individual who is or has been entrusted
with a prominent function that has the potential to be
abused for the purpose of laundering illicit funds or
other predicate offences such as corruption or bribery.63 However, many challenges face the international financial community with respect to PEPs. To
begin with, there is no universal definition of a PEP.
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For example, the FATF explicitly limits PEPs to individuals with prominent functions in a foreign country, while the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) defines PEPs (without employing
the term itself) as “individuals who are, or have been,
entrusted with prominent public functions, and their
family members and close associates,” widening the
definition to include those close to a prominent official, while leaving open whether these should include
domestic or foreign officials. A further dilemma is
deciding how wide the circle of PEPs should be.64
Some jurisdictions restrict the definition to spouses; others to spouses and their children—whilst other
broader definitions include current and former spouses, their children, as well as their girlfriends or boyfriends.65 One consideration is that, once individuals
have been identified as a PEP, they retain their PEP
status, adding considerable burdens on the institutions that need to monitor their financial activity as
the circle of PEPs grows larger and larger. If this additional monitoring volume resulted in the increase in
the detection of suspicious transactions, there would
be justification in adopting the wider definition. However, there is no concrete evidence to suggest that this
is the case, with some arguing that the wider definition simply leads to data deluge and may have the opposite effect by overburdening the system.66
Regardless of who may or may not constitute a
PEP, it is a requirement in most jurisdictions that all financial institutions have a system in place to monitor
financial transactions.67 If there is suspicion about the
nature of a financial transaction, a Suspicious Activity
Report (SAR) is required to be submitted to the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) of that country, stipulating whether the transactions represent either potential
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money-laundering or terrorist financing activity, and
stating the reason for the suspicion together with details of any internal investigations carried out to date.68
However, the international AML regime is far
from being a perfect system. There has been criticism that AML is more about managing regulatory
risk for financial institutions as opposed to tackling
the problem of money laundering itself.69 In addition,
as a result of inadequate cooperation between FIUs,
law enforcement agencies, and the private sector, data
captured are not adequately shared or utilized. However, despite these imperfections, one positive aspect
of the AML regime is that the data have at least been
captured, and where early detection was missed, these
can still be used retrospectively to bring about a successful prosecution at a later date.
One challenge that U.S. Army intelligence officers should be aware of is that financial intelligence
alone is often insufficient to arouse suspicion. For example, research into the financial transactions of the
9/11 hijackers in the 6 months leading to the attacks
highlighted the fact that the financial transactions in
themselves were unlikely to have indicated impending terrorist activity, even if a better AML regime had
existed at that time.70
However, when financial intelligence is combined
with other intelligence, its real usefulness emerges.
Not only is financial intelligence able to provide evidence that can be presented in an international court
of law, but analysis also can lead to the discovery of
networks, and the use of big data is capable of detecting financial flow patterns at a macro level, which can
reveal new leads for investigations. Consequently,
better awareness of AML capabilities coupled with
inter-agency cooperation and improved information
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sharing can enable the interdiction of funds flowing
out of developing countries raised through the proceeds of corruption.
It should also be noted that financial information
that can then be turned into financial intelligence
through analysis could be obtained through numerous sources. This is true, not only for “financial” intelligence but for intelligence in general. For example, in
UK law enforcement agencies, all police officers, and
police staff submit “intelligence” in the form of Information Submission Reports (ISRs). In other words,
information collection and submission for intelligence
purposes is considered the duty of all police officers,
not just those directly tasked with intelligence duties.71
This is equally true in the U.S. Army, where non-intelligence Soldiers collect raw data, typically during
patrol. All Soldiers are considered part of the intelligence collection process, especially in light of the past
decade of COIN lessons learned.72 For example, in the
U.S. Marines, intelligence collection has been part of
pre-deployment briefs for infantry units since 2002,
prior to the invasion of Iraq, where “every Marine was
considered a collector.”73
Unfortunately, financial information or intelligence is often overlooked, as it has not traditionally
been part of patrol collection requirements.74 However, if the significance of financial intelligence is fully
understood in the context of the anti-corruption mission, and the collection of financial information is part
of the intelligence collection requirements for military
personnel on patrol, then it is likely that highly relevant information can be captured.
It is worth noting that channels of communication on financial intelligence between the military and
other agencies, the private sector, and the judiciary are

29

generally deficient or poor at best. This is because the
organizations involved with financial intelligence are
not aware of how useful and relevant military intelligence can be, and equally, the military are not aware
of the organizations and capabilities that are potentially available to them. Military commanders and
their intelligence analysts at all levels should be aware
of this potential, and seek to develop ways in which
financial intelligence can be shared and nurtured to
the benefit of all stakeholders involved in tackling corruption networks. Platoon- and company-level commanders, in addition to their S-2/G-2 colleagues (as
lieutenants and captains), may be some of the more
suitable individuals to take the initiative and develop
information-sharing suggestions and identify local
financial intelligence sources. In addition, it is worth
noting that new leads often come from the junior enlisted, who are often the most tactically engaged in data
aggregation.
IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL
AID ON CORRUPTION
There has been a general tendency not only for the
U.S. Army but also the West in general to adopt a onesided narrative blaming corruption on local culture.
Afghanistan is a case in point: “corruption” within
Afghanistan is identified as the reason so many international stabilization interventions have to date been
unsuccessful.75 However, it is interesting to note that
most Afghans tend to think of corruption as a relatively new problem for their country, introduced in
2001 when international troops arrived in the country.
They believe that corruption evolved progressively
since that time, driven by international aid. Many in
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the international community also agree that it was
the sustained volume of mismanaged international
funding that has created a new culture of corruption
in Afghanistan, which has since become an epidemic.76 According to recent Transparency International
reporting:
20 years ago corruption was a shame among Afghans.
If you were corrupt, your life was hell because people
would stop talking to you. And now that’s completely
changed. A new culture has risen: if you’re not corrupt, people think you’re stupid.77

There is a broad body of evidence to suggest that aid
can distort the economies of conflict-affected countries, especially if the volume of funding exceeds the
country’s capacity to absorb these funds, fueling rentseeking and providing incentives for corruption in the
process.78 Karl Eikenberry, former Commander of the
U.S.-led Coalition Forces in Afghanistan and former
U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, has acknowledged
this problem:
The net result of our well-intentioned efforts is that the international and national development agencies, along with
the NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and US
military forces, ﬂooded Afghanistan with cash to such an
extent that efforts to build accountable institutions suffered
[italics in original].79

In the case of Afghanistan, the sums of money
ﬂowing into Afghanistan have been extremely large.
Total U.S. spending since 2001 has exceeded $760 billion, which included approximately $104 billion in
reconstruction funding up to mid-2014.80 However,
the inability of post-conflict countries to absorb the
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sheer volume of incoming financial flows is not a new
problem, nor an issue that is unique to Afghanistan.81
Peacekeeping and country stabilization operations
are inevitably accompanied by large amounts of aid
and financial assistance, while the lack of local infrastructure and economy make it difficult to spend the
money in country. Liberia is another example where
aid and other financial contributions, such as security
expenditures by foreign militaries, have exceeded the
local gross domestic product (GDP) by multiples. The
inability to absorb funding is often exacerbated by the
need to disburse funds quickly in order to address
emergency situations, or achieve highly visible “quick
wins” through rapid impact projects, and to proceed
without robust procurement and auditing procedures.
For example, there has been wide criticism of the
tendency for the international community, in particular the United States, to prioritize the speed and scale
of the disbursement of funds over the achievement
of concrete project goals. In fact, recent research has
shown that many projects were implemented without
adequate consideration of local concerns or the potential impact on similar projects already in operation
by other donors from the international community.
Instead, many of the projects were considered to be
“throwing” funding at a project as a way to demonstrate commitment without giving adequate consideration to the effectiveness or impact of the project.
Consequently, the desire to be seen as “doing” overrode many other concerns, including accountability
and corruption.82
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Mismanagement of International Aid and Funding.
Evidence from stabilization and peacekeeping operations suggest that international interventions and
aid can develop and exacerbate the problem of corruption if not managed effectively.83 This is relevant
to the U.S. Army because it may not be aware that
well-intended actions may in fact create and worsen
the problem of corruption, which may hinder future
efforts. In the case of Afghanistan, problems relating
to corruption were manifested at operational levels
during the early stages of the intervention as a consequence of a lack of control over early inflow of funds.
According to one senior policymaker interviewed by
Transparency International:
Much of the corruption was introduced by some elements of the very poorly planned aid response and
the ﬂood of unaccountable money through multiple
channels.84

In addition to the sheer volume of money entering Afghanistan, pressure from international donors
to deliver results within a short time frame resulted in
a climate of perverse spending.85 For example, in April
2013, it was reported in “International Policy Maker”
that the heads of the United Nations (UN) agencies
on the ground were given 10 days to write $2.7 billion
worth of projects.86 One consequence was that much
of the work was outsourced to external contractors, as
governments lacked the capacity to deliver the projects internally. The use of external contractors in itself
is not a problem. However, a general lack of coordinated planning and management led to the creation
of numerous opaque deals, with minimal monitor-
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ing and evaluation. As both local and international
individuals and institutions proﬁted quickly in an
environment of fast-moving deals and general lack of
transparency, coupled with the absence of corruptionreducing measures, these factors combined to encourage a climate of corruption.
Absence of central coordination of effort adds to
the confusion. This is particularly problematic, given
the number of international donors and agencies routinely operating in the same space, to include the U.S.
Army. The situation is further exacerbated by the fact
that if a state is considered to be incapable of self-management, as well as being generally corrupt, most aid
and interventions will bypass it.87 The understandable
concern of most donor countries is that if aid is given
directly to the state, the money will be mismanaged or
stolen rather than being used for its intended purpose.
Consequently, donors prefer to provide funding off
budget to ensure better control of their investments.
However, this approach has two problems.
First, bypassing the state is often found to further
weaken state authority, which directly contradicts
the purpose of funding intended to put governance
measures in place to strengthen the state and give it
legitimacy. Research into the impact of aid and informal social service delivery by Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs) or communities at a local level
has shown that this often revives and reinforces the
patronage power of local elites, who become the gatekeepers to aid and services.88 Notably, the way that
the 2002 Loya Jirga (grand assembly) was run in Afghanistan was denounced as “throwing money . . . at
corrupt and predatory local actors.”89 This situation
was compounded when no steps were taken to rein
in the warlords, and consequently their power and
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inﬂuence grew, further exacerbating corruption as
well as bringing further security concerns.
The second problem is that direct delivery of aid
and interventions (i.e., bypassing the state) does not
necessarily result in successful delivery of projects free
from corruption. Indeed, there is an internal dimension to corruption risks that must also be considered.
Despite the expectation of peacekeeping and statebuilding missions to be conducted with integrity,
the record is replete with instances where they have
directly contributed to increased corruption levels either by the misdeeds of a few individuals or a failure
to understand the consequences of not tackling corruption. In the case of the military involved in peacekeeping operations, there is potential for corruption
in financing troops and equipment, which often lacks
effective oversight. As such, it is likely that U.S. Army
commanders will need to be extra vigilant and have
oversight structures in place to ensure that equipment
and money are used by in-country troops as intended
by donors.
The areas that require particular attention in terms
of corruption risk are theft, fraud, and waste, especially in relation to external contracting. Many cases of
theft from within peacekeeping missions involve saleable commodities, such as food and fuel. For example, fuel mismanagement, theft, and fraud have been
found across a number of UN peacekeeping missions,
including UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI),
UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), and UN Organization Stabilization Mission in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO).90
Resulting from inadequate supervision and poor record-keeping, several cases of large-scale theft by local
and/or UN staff, and collusion with nationals to sell
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the goods to local markets, have been reported. Fraud
and waste is another significant issue. For example,
according to the Commission on Wartime Contracting, “at least $31 billion, and possibly as much as $60
billion” of U.S. funds were lost because of contracting waste and fraud in Afghanistan and Iraq between
ﬁnancial years 2002 and 2011.91
These are not new problems; the challenges were
familiar from earlier interventions. Consequently,
better measures should have been in place to ensure
that all funding included proper conditionality and
much-tighter oversight of disbursement. However,
this oversight and effective management of funds and
assets continue to be lacking. As peacekeeping operations are large consumers of international funds, they
can unintentionally fuel and entrench corruption in
fragile and conflict-affected environments.92 Since corruption is likely to account for a larger proportion of
illicit flows coming out of the least developed countries, which are dependent on aid, it is of paramount
importance that the dual internal-external nature of
corruption threats to missions—which are a function
of local conditions and the impact of international actors—are acknowledged and tackled.93
HOW CORRUPTION FUELS CONFLICT
AND INSTABILITY
The main reason for the U.S. Army to engage with
peacekeeping operations and state-building missions
is to encourage peace and bring stability to the region
it has been tasked to assist. As such, it is essential the
the U.S. Army is aware of factors that will undermine
this mission—such as corruption. Yet, systematic evidence of the impact of aid on corruption is lacking.
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This is partly because of the unavailability of reliable
data, especially in conflict-affected countries, but also
because of the challenges of measuring corruption in
a meaningful way. However, there is evidence to suggest corruption fuels conflict and instability. As highlighted above, the relationship between corruption
and conflict is symbiotic in that corruption increases
the risk of conflict and, in turn, conflict increases the
risk of corruption. Together, this relationship threatens peace and stability in states already besieged by
violence. Corruption-fueled conflict and instability
that the U.S military should be aware of is discussed
next in several ways.
Social Grievances.
Corruption often leads to a sense of inequality
and injustice as a result of discrimination felt by individuals and groups who are excluded from the elite
who benefit from it. In addition, corruption distorts
government decisions and undermines the provision
of public services such as education and healthcare.94
This in turn can drive populations to civil war, as well
as leave them susceptible to crime and radicalization,
both as perpetrators and as victims.
Rents.
“Rents” refer to incomes that are higher than
would otherwise have been earned.95 The rent-seeking
opportunities that come with corruption can provide
incentives for violent conflict as those excluded from
power and rents use violence to seek access and control over these opportunities.96 This is especially true
in countries that are resource-rich.97 If corruption has
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transformed the state from a set of institutions providing public goods into a set of institutions to be exploited for private gain, the state becomes a prize to
be fought over.
Criminality.
The relationship between corruption and organized crime is symbiotic. Criminal entities use a combination of violence, intimidation through the threat
of violence, and corruption to establish control. Organized crime groups (OCG) take advantage of corruption, whilst corrupt officials also benefit from OCGs by
maintaining their personal position of power as well
as financially in the form of kickbacks. In some cases,
“political patronage” creates a vertical system of corruption that functions from top to bottom in all public
institutions, to include politicians, government administative agencies, and judiciary and law enforcement
agencies.98
Corruption also facilitates the operation of illegal
markets such as narcotics, extortion, and human trafficking. This is particularly the case for fragile states,
which lack stable markets where transactions are organized according to entrenched rules and order is
maintained through strong leadership, hierarchy, and
authority.99 In unstable markets, disputes over the control of territory and markets are likely to result in the
use of violence by the criminal organizations in competition. In certain drug markets, for example, sudden
changes in demand and supply for a drug can create
instability between the organizations involved in the
drug trade and, consequently, increase the chances of
violence. Organized crime enables conflict, and the illicit sources of funding derived from the proceeds of
crime extend the duration of conflicts.100
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Insurgency.
Corruption can fuel insurgency in several ways.
First, if money intended to be used to pay the salaries of soldiers or police officers is siphoned off by
their corrupt leaders, those men will not be paid and
will be unable to feed themselves or their families.
One consequence is that they will leave their post to
join the local insurgency based purely on economic,
as opposed to ideological, grounds. As such, the
men who were meant to be fighting the insurgency
switch sides to become the enemy, further adding
pressure on national and international security forces.
In Afghanistan, where this has been a common occurrence, recent interventions have included the deployment of UK Technical Advisors for the purpose
of ensuring that each police officer is identified and
paid directly to prevent this. Second, corrupt activities can fund insurgencies directly, which then can
fuel instability as well as pose direct physical threats
to peacekeeping troops on the ground.101 Third, an
insurgency leader, through effective information
operations aimed at winning over the population as
well as external supporters, can exploit moral outrage over corrupt practices by the state to support the
insurgency.102
Terrorism.
There is a substantial body of terrorism research
demonstrating how individuals become radicalized as
a result of a sense of injustice.103 Corruption augments
this sense of injustice and may consequently contribute to radicalization. Once part of a terrorist organization, terrorists may finance themselves through crimi-
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nal activities facilitated by corruption. Alternatively,
the terrorist organization may have linkages with
OCGs, where corruption is used to further criminal
activities. Evidence with respect to the financing of the
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), for example,
highlights the fact that terrorist groups continue to depend on illicit networks and appropriate their tactics
to help finance their operations.104 According to the
FATF, ISIL:
manages a sophisticated extortion racket by robbing,
looting, and demanding a portion of the economic resources in areas where it operates, which is similar to
how some organized crime groups [and nonstate conflict actors] generate funds. This vast range of extortion, including everything from fuel and vehicle taxes
to school fees for children, is done under the auspices
of providing notional services or protection.105

UNDERSTANDING THE CHALLENGES
Numerous challenges exist in tackling corruption.
These challenges need to be understood by the U.S.
Army and its partners so that appropriate action can be
taken to amend existing policies and practices and incorporate effective anti-corruption measures in existing and future operations. In addition, there is a need
to raise awareness of the issues relating to corruption
and its impact on wider peacekeeping missions and
state-building interventions in order to be able to better manage the expectations of future missions.
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Short-Term Stabilization Effect.
Corruption undermines the long-term goals of
peacebuilding, but at the same time, it has the potential
to help stabilize post-conflict situations in the short- to
medium-term.106 This paradox makes it very difficult
for peacebuilding actors to devise anti-corruption
policies that will not backfire and contribute to more
violence in the years immediately after the conflict.107
Increase in Short-Term Instability.
Anti-corruption interventions in the immediate
short term can have negative side effects. In Afghanistan, for example, interventions aimed at stemming
corruption associated with the production and trade
of opium controlled by local warlords led to an immediate increase in violence.108 This is particularly
problematic for commanders, who are typically in
post for a year, because there is considerable pressure to achieve visible results, which may be unrealistic, especially during the period of a single mission/
deployment.109
Conflict of Interest.
Where anti-corruption measures exist as part of
the overall peacekeeping and stabilization program,
stabilization advisers and peacekeeping missions are
likely to be forced into a conflict of interest in that they
are forced to work with corrupt regimes, since removing those regimes outright would do greater harm and
risk the collapse of the entire regime.

41

Political Support.
Eliminating corruption requires genuine political
buy-in driven by top leadership, extending throughout the entire political elite and down to the grass roots
level of society. This can be difficult if corruption has
become an institutionalized practice. Even where the
leadership is committed to tackling corruption, it is
likely to be confronted with considerable resistance. It
is highly unlikely that progress can be made quickly,
with positive results unlikely to be evident until the
next generation.
Economic Dependence.
The political elite are the main beneficiaries of corruption and are likely to be receiving payments that
they should not be getting, driven by greed as a result of corrupt practices. At the same time, many officials at the grass-roots level receive low rates of pay.
To make matters worse, even those payments may be
inconsistent, especially when senior officials siphon
off payments intended for lower-ranking officers. As
such, corrupt payments are needed to supplement
salaries in order to be able to provide basic economic
support for themselves and their families.
Lack of Rule of Law.
There is no internally recognized court in international criminal law, except for crimes committed
against international humanitarian law, making the
prosecution of corrupt officials difficult, especially
when they cannot be prosecuted domestically due to
the corruption in the judicial system.
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Short-Term Strategy.
The problem of corruption cannot be resolved
overnight. Nevertheless, there is a tendency for peacekeeping missions to consider short-term gains in the
quickest possible timeframe. Unfortunately, shortterm strategies for a long-term problem never work.
Lack of Continuation of Missions.
Due to the long-term nature of the problem, anticorruption measures will be an ongoing issue that
needs to be handed over to successive missions.
However, research has repeatedly shown that the continuity between missions necessary to achieve longerterm objectives is absent.110
CONCLUSION—CORRUPTION AND STABILITY
The relationship between corruption and stability
is complex. It is often difficult to establish whether unstable environments result in corrupt regimes or vice
versa, as corruption is both a cause and an effect. In
addition, the perception of what constitutes corruption will differ from country to country. As such, there
cannot be a single universal resolution to tackling the
problem. Instead, assessments need to be made on a
case-by-case basis to determine the best way of implementing anti-corruption measures.
Furthermore, an understanding of the requirement
for delicacy and circumspection in tackling corruption is essential. Peacekeeping forces have to balance
a number of competing goals and objectives. An overaggressive implementation of anti-corruption measures carried out in haste is likely to do more harm
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to stability—making careful consideration of whom to
target and how, a must. There may be no option but to
work with local actors involved in corruption in order
to help stabilize a particular region. However, what
is important is to discard the existing paradigm that
corruption is somehow an inevitable part of the context in which peacekeeping missions must operate, as
those beliefs will be counterproductive to the longerterm objectives of the missions.
In many ways, the relationship between corruption
and instability is not only symbiotic, but also multidimensional. Positive factors such as good governance,
establishment of effective rule of law institutions and
practice, as well as good leadership will have the effect of negating corruption. On the other hand, poor
governance and corrupt leadership will have the opposite effect and exacerbates the problem, ultimately
leading to instability and the need for further international interventions. The following recommendations
are designed to help commanders and policymakers
avoid this eventuality.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendation 1: Develop an Integrated
Approach.
Develop an integrated approach whereby anti-corruption considerations and measures are integrated
into existing policy and operational procedures, and
not treated as a standalone problem. Approach the
subject in a multidisciplinary manner to ensure that as
many “solutions” as possible are considered.
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Recommendation 2: Develop Contextual
Understanding.
Assess how and why corrupt leadership and poor
governance can lead to conflict and instability, and
their impact on wider global security. Also, develop
an appreciation of the broader political agenda and
the work of partner agencies in the field of anti-corruption, which have direct relevance to U.S. peacekeeping operations.
Recommendation 3: Address Knowledge Gaps.
Highlight knowledge gaps that must be filled in
order to be able to make an accurate assessment of the
success/failure of existing measures to counter the
threat. Consider also how anti-corruption efforts, direct or indirect, can have a legitimizing and stabilizing
effect.
Recommendation 4: Prepare for Unintended
Consequences.
Develop awareness of the possible side effects of
existing countermeasures to tackle corruption, which
may be counterproductive in protecting U.S. national
security interests in the medium to long term.
Recommendation 5: Training and Education.
Enable personnel at all levels to develop a deeper
understanding of corruption and its impact on peacekeeping missions as well as on broader security implications through operationally relevant training and
education.
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Recommendation 6: Exercise Diplomacy.
Exercise particular caution when working with officials from corrupt governments and be fully aware
of the implications and power balances at play when
tackling corruption.
Recommendation 7: Achieve Transparency Through
Monitoring and Evaluation.
Encourage the implementation of monitoring and
evaluation policies where possible to promote a culture of transparency that will assist in the prevention
of corruption. This is of particular importance when
outsourcing projects to external contractors.
Recommendation 8: Intelligence Assessments.
Ensure that corruption is addressed as a key
component of security risk assessments. Increase the
number of personnel assigned to examine elements of
corrupt networks and their operations. Areas of focus
should include network structures, facilitators, preferred sources of revenue, patterns of life, protection
mechanisms, and vulnerabilities.
Recommendation 9: Financial Intelligence.
Design and develop intelligence collection requirements aimed at filling existing knowledge gaps in
corrupt networks, in order to leverage financial intelligence to support the broader intelligence picture on
networks sustained by corruption.
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Recommendation 10: Know the Global
Financial System.
Be aware of the global system that exists to combat
threat finance, and take full advantage of the different
authorities that monitor potentially suspicious financial transactions, especially with respect to PEPs.
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